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- From: tar@math.ksu.edu (Tim Ramsey)
- Newsgroups: alt.security
- Subject: Re: username 'sync'
- Date: 24 Jan 1992 02:29:56 GMT
- Organization: Kansas State University
- Message-ID: <knuuh4INNil6@moe.ksu.ksu.edu>
- References: <799@itexjct.jct.ac.il>
-
- noam@itexjct.jct.ac.il (The Backup Man) writes:
-
- > Is there a way someone can break into a system via the 'sync'
- >account?
-
- Given:
-
- SunOS 4.1 or later;
-
- A userid "sync" with a known password or no password;
-
- The userid's shell set to a dynamically linked executable;
-
- A second account on the system that you can use to execute the
- "login" command;
-
- I think you have a security hole. I can build a shared C library
- of my own, set LD_LIBRARY_PATH to reference my library instead of
- the standard system shared C library, and execute
-
- login -p
-
- and log in as "sync". Since login keeps the previous environment, the
- dynamically linked shell will use my shared library instead of the system
- library, executing it with "sync"'s uid. Under SunOS 4.1+ "sync" has the
- same uid as "daemon", so you have the privileges that "daemon" has.
-
- I'm posting this because the fix is trivial: either change "sync"'s
- uid to be the same as "nobody", or set "sync"'s password to be
- something like "*BLOCKED*".
-
- --
- Tim Ramsey/system administrator/tar@math.ksu.edu/(913) 532-6750/2-7004 (FAX)
- Department of Mathematics, Kansas State University, Manhattan KS 66506-2602
-
-